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Levels of emotional awareness and autism: an fMRI study
Abstract
Autism is associated with an inability to identify and distinguish one's own feelings. We assessed this
inability using alexithymia and empathy questionnaires, and used fMRI to investigate brain activity
while introspecting on emotion. Individuals with high functioning autism/Asperger syndrome (HFA/AS)
were compared with matched controls. Participants rated stimuli from the International Affective Picture
System twice, once according to the degree of un/pleasantness that the pictures induced, and once
according to their color balance. The groups differed significantly on both alexithymia and empathy
questionnaires. Alexithymia and lack of empathy were correlated, indicating a link between
understanding one's own and others' emotions. For both groups a strong relationship between
questionnaire scores and brain activity was found in the anterior insula (AI), when participants were
required to assess their feelings to unpleasant pictures. Regardless of selfreported degree of emotional
awareness, individuals with HFA/AS differed from controls when required to introspect on their feelings
by showing reduced activation in self-reflection/mentalizing regions. Thus, we conclude that difficulties
in emotional awareness are related to hypoactivity in AI in both individuals with HFA/AS and controls,
and that the particular difficulties in emotional awareness in individuals with HFA/AS are not related to
their impairments in selfreflection/mentalizing.
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Autism is associated with an inability to identify and distinguish one’s own feelings. We assessed 
this inability using alexithymia and empathy questionnaires, and used fMRI to investigate brain 
activity while introspecting on emotion. Individuals with high functioning autism/Asperger 
syndrome (HFA/AS) were compared with matched controls. Participants rated stimuli from the 
International Affective Picture System twice, once according to the degree of un/pleasantness that 
the pictures induced, and once according to their color balance. The groups differed significantly on 
both alexithymia and empathy questionnaires. Alexithymia and lack of empathy were correlated, 
indicating a link between understanding one’s own and others’ emotions. For both groups a strong 
relationship between questionnaire scores and brain activity was found in the anterior insula (AI), 
when participants were required to assess their feelings to unpleasant pictures. Regardless of self-
reported degree of emotional awareness, individuals with HFA/AS differed from controls when 
required to introspect on their feelings by showing reduced activation in self-reflection/mentalizing 
regions. Thus, we conclude that difficulties in emotional awareness are related to hypoactivity in AI 
in both individuals with HFA/AS and controls, and that the particular difficulties in emotional 






Individuals with high functioning autism and Asperger syndrome (henceforth HFA/AS) often have 
difficulties in attributing mental states, such as beliefs, desires or intentions to others (see Frith, 2004, for 
a review). The neurophysiological basis of this ability, often referred to as mentalizing, can be 
demonstrated in a network of regions, which shows reduced activation in this group (see Frith & Frith, 
2006, for a review). However, much less is known of how these high-functioning individuals experience 
their own bodily and emotional states, although a number of studies  
suggest that this experience is abnormal, with impaired emotional awareness being frequently reported 
(Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994; Rieffe, Meerum 
Terwogt, & Kotronopoulou, 2006). This study aimed to increase this knowledge by investigating 
emotional awareness in HFA/AS.  
Difficulties in emotional awareness characterize the condition known as alexithymia. This is a subclinical 
phenomenon marked by difficulties in identifying and describing feelings. These include difficulties in 
distinguishing feelings from the bodily sensations of emotional arousal (Nemiah, Freyberg, & Sifneos, 
1976). Alexithymia is thought to characterize 10% of the general population (Linden, Wen, & Paulhaus, 
1994; Salminen, Saarijarvi, Aarela, Toikka, & Kauhanen, 1999). However, in recent studies with 
individuals with HFA/AS severe degrees of alexithymia have been found to affect about 50% of this 
population (Hill et al., 2004). Given these results, and the well-documented impairments in mentalizing in 
this group, Hill et al. (2004) suggested a relationship between mentalizing difficulties (impairments in 
representing mental states of the self) and difficulties in the experience of own emotions. Under this 
hypothesis the representation of mental states is necessary for emotional awareness.  
Lambie and Marcel (2002) have reviewed models of emotional experience and argued for a framework 
where a distinction is made between the neurophysiological arousal associated with emotions (first-order 
experience) and the awareness of this arousal, often referred to as interoception (second-order 
experience). In addition, we need to consider a third level, arising from the requirement to introspect on 
one’s inner experience, an aspect that is particularly relevant for autism. This level involves an awareness 
of a self who has emotions and can monitor them and is different from a second-order bodily awareness 
of emotions. If impaired introspection or self-reflection characterizes autism (Kennedy, Redcay, & 
Courchesne, 2006), then we would expect the self-reflective system to be less active. In individuals with 
autism who also have a high degree of alexithymia this activity might be reduced still further when they 
are required to introspect on their emotions.  
First-order emotional experience has been associated with increased activity in the amygdala and 
orbitofrontal cortex in studies of both implicit and explicit emotions in normal individuals (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005). In autism there is evidence for reduced activation of this system in the presence of fearful 
faces (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O’Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007). However, there is as yet little 
evidence about responses to emotionally arousing pictures other than faces. If a lack of neural response to 
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strong emotion is characteristic of autism, then we would predict that amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex 
would show reduced activation. Even less activation might be expected in individuals with autism who 
report alexithymic symptoms.  
Second-order awareness of bodily states associated with emotions, or interoceptive awareness, is a 
particularly promising candidate for the explanation of alexithymic symptoms. Several studies have 
recently focused on the so-called interoceptive cortex (Craig, 2002, 2003) and suggested a crucial role for 
insular-somatosensory as well as anterior cingulate cortices (ACC) in the processing and representation of 
the internal arousal and bodily states that may underpin core conscious feeling states (Craig, 2003; 
Critchley, 2005; Damasio, 1994). In particular, anterior insula activation has been observed in a wide 
range of imaging studies associated with positive and negative subjective feelings such as perceived 
unpleasantness of painful stimulation (Craig, Chen, Bandy, & Reiman, 2000). Imaging studies focusing 
on the relationship between peripheral measures of arousal and brain activity also provide robust evidence 
for the crucial role of rostral ACC and anterior insular cortices in the representation of internal bodily 
states of arousal as well as emotional awareness. For example, activity in insula, somatomotor and 
cingulate cortices was observed when participants were asked to monitor their heartbeat and judge 
whether concurrent auditory feedback was either synchronous or delayed. Furthermore, both the activity 
and cortical thickness of the right anterior insula were correlated with performance on the heartbeat 
monitoring task as well as the participants’ subjective rating of their visceral awareness (Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). Singer and colleagues have extended these approaches by 
suggesting that these representations may not only serve the awareness of own feeling states, but may also 
underlie the capacity to empathize, that is to share the feelings of others who are, for example, in pain or 
experiencing disgust (Singer et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003).  
All these findings suggest that the anterior insula and ACC are involved in conscious representation of 
internal bodily states. Therefore we would expect to observe reduced activation of the anterior insula 
region in individuals with autism who also have a high degree of alexithymia. Moreover, in view of the 
critical role of the insula in empathic responses, we would expect, at the behavioral level, a relationship 
between degree of self-reported alexithymia and degree of self-reported lack of empathy; at the 
physiological level, we would expect that the amount of insula activation would correlate with the degree 
of self-reported alexithymia and lack of empathy.  
The present study targeted the neurophysiological processes that underlie awareness of strong emotions as 
elicited by picture stimuli in individuals with, and without, an autistic spectrum disorder and varying 
degrees of alexithymia. Thus, first, we assessed participants with HFA/AS and controls with both 
Alexithymia scales and Empathy questionnaires. Second, we carried out an fMRI study using a version of 
the paradigm developed by Lane, Fink, Chau, and Dolan (1997). Participants viewed picture stimuli from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) and either rated the emotion evoked in them by the 
stimuli (Internal task), or judged the black/white color balance present in the stimuli (External task). The 
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contrast between strong negative vs. neutral stimuli, regardless of the task set required, elucidates the 
presence or absence of neural responses to arousing stimuli (first-order: having an emotional response). 
The interaction between task set and emotional valence assesses the effect of interoceptive awareness, 
that is the awareness of bodily sensations in the presence of emotional arousal (second order: being aware 
of bodily sensations). The contrast between the Internal and the External task reveals processes 
underlying the task set of introspection (third order: being aware of having emotions).  
Thus, the design of the present study allowed two orthogonal questions to be addressed. First, what are 
the neural systems that relate to the degree of self-reported emotional awareness, e.g., alexithymia and 
lack of empathy? Second, what are the differences between neural responses to emotional stimuli in 
individuals with HFA/AS and matched controls?  
 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES  
Participants  
Fifteen participants (13 male; 2 female) with autistic disorder (ASD) and fifteen control participants (13 
male; 2 female) were recruited for this study. Groups were matched on age (ASD M: 36.6 years SD: 11.7, 
Control M: 33.7 years SD: 10.3) and IQ as assessed using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(Wechsler, 1999) (ASD M: 117.6 SD: 13.5, Control M: 119.6 SD: 11.4). All participants in the HFA/AS 
group were high functioning and had previously received a diagnosis of autism or Asperger syndrome 
from an independent clinician according to standard criteria (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). In line with current practice, we used the Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule (ADOS; Lord 
et al., 1989) to corroborate the clinical diagnosis. All participants met ADOS criteria for HFA/AS (see 
Appendix, Figure A1). Control participants were screened for any preexisting neurological or psychiatric 
disorders using a questionnaire/interview. Participants gave their informed consent to participate in the 
study, which was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in accordance with the ethical 
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.  
Questionnaires  
The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) and the BermondVorst 
Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ-B; Vorst & Bermond, 2001) were used to index the degree to which 
participants reported alexithymic tendencies. Individual differences in empathy were assessed with the 
Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980).  
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Stimuli  
Participants were presented with full-color pictures selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bagby, & Cuthbert, 1999a). Pictures were projected onto a screen positioned at the 
head end of the MRI scanner. Participants viewed the screen through a mirror mounted on the head coil. 
For each picture within this set, standardized valence and arousal scores are available. These scores are 
expressed on a 9-point scale from low to high arousal and from pleasant to unpleasant (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1999b). Pictures were categorized according to their valence into three types of stimuli: 
unpleasant, pleasant and neutral. In order to prevent stereotyped responses and to elicit deeper 
introspection on emotions, we excluded pictures on the extremes of the pleasantness-unpleasantness 
dimension. In order to elicit strong emotional bodily responses, we selected pictures with high arousal 
ratings. We used 90 unpleasant (valence M: 3.39, SD: 0.59, arousal M: 5.96, SD: 0.71), 90 pleasant 
(valence M: 6.98, SD: 0.36, arousal M: 5.79, SD: 0.54) and 90 neutral (valence M: 4.97, SD: 0.22, 
arousal M: 2.58, SD: 0.39) stimuli. The pleasant and unpleasant sets were comparable in terms of their 
arousal ratings (two-sample t-test; p = 0.3). Unpleasant stimuli were of main interest in the exploration of 
interoceptive awareness, as highly arousing negative picture stimuli have proved to be capable of evoking 
body arousal responses more reliably than positive stimuli (Baumgartner, Esslen, & Jancke, 2006; 
Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007).  
Behavioral study  
In order to establish whether the individuals with HFA/AS understood the tasks in the same way as the 
controls, and found them of equal difficulty, we carried out a subsequent study outside the scanner. In this 
study we obtained individual valence ratings as well as RT measures for a parallel set of IAPS pictures, 
which were matched on arousal and valence ratings with that used in the functional imaging study. We 
used a parallel set because we wanted to avoid unwanted familiarity effects and possible habituation, 
which might have distorted the ratings. The set consisted of three subsets of 30 pictures each of positive, 
negative and neutral emotional content. We used 5 response categories rather than an analogue scale in 
order to obtain RTs. Accordingly, participants used a 5-button response pad. All other conditions were the 
same as in the scanner. Thus, participants saw the pictures twice, once using the instructions for the 
Internal task and once using the instructions for the External task with appropriate counterbalancing.  
Functional imaging study  
Procedure. The factorial design of the task is presented in Figure 1. There were two tasks, one Internal, 
one External, and three types of stimuli, unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant. In the Internal task participants 
were asked to rate the emotion evoked by the stimulus on a visual analogue scale presented immediately 
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after the stimulus, where the end points of the scale were labeled ‘‘Positive’’ and ‘‘Negative.’’ In the 
External task, participants were asked to indicate the ratio of black and white colored pixels in the 
stimulus picture (a physical aspect of the stimulus). Ratings were made on a visual analogue scale, the 
extremes of which were labeled ‘‘Black’’ and ‘‘White.’’  
Testing began with a training session outside of the scanner, in order to familiarize the participants with 
the tasks to be performed during the scanning session. All sessions were divided into three runs of 15 
minutes each with breaks in between. Each trial began with the presentation of the picture for two 
seconds, followed by a four-second period in which participants indicated their response on a visual 
analogue scale. A fixation cross presented for one second marked the end of the current trial and the start 
of the next. Participants responded by moving a pointer along the scale using a response box, where they 
had to use index and middle finger to press one of two buttons so as to move a cursor on the scale. 
Labeling of the scale extremes (e.g., positive left, negative right, or vice versa), and the starting position 
of the pointer was randomly determined on every trial in order to discourage response preparation during 
the time in which the stimulus was viewed.  
Both task and stimulus valence were blocked such that in any one block participants only performed one 
task and saw one kind of stimulus (unpleasant, pleasant, or neutral). Five pictures were presented in each 
block, and each block lasted for 35 seconds (see Figure 1). Rest blocks (of the same duration) were also 
presented in which the participants viewed a white cross in the middle of a black background. Instructions 
presented before each block informed participants which of the two tasks they were to perform. A total of 
9 blocks per type of stimulus (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) for the Internal task, 9 blocks per type of 
stimulus (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) for the external task, and 18 blocks of resting period were 
presented during the three runs of the scanning session. The order of blocks and thus task and stimulus 
category were randomized within participants.  
Figure 1 about here 
Imaging data acquisition. MRI brain images were acquired with a 1.5 Tesla system (Siemens Sonata). 
Structural images were acquired with a T1 sequence using a phased-array headcoil. Functional whole 
brain data were obtained using a T2* echoplanar sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast (33 slices, 3 mm 
thickness, gap 1.5 mm, TE 90 ms, TR 2970 ms per volume). Slices were angled in an oblique orientation 
5° to the anterior-posterior commissural line. The functional data were acquired in three sessions, the first 
six volumes of each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Stimulus presentation 
began after the sixth volume. A total of 795 full-brain volumes for each participant were acquired.  
Imaging data analyses. fMRI data were analyzed using SPM 2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK). To correct for motion, functional images were realigned to the first volume 
and then spatially normalized to a standard template with a resampled voxel size of 2 x 2 x 2 mm, and 
smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with of 10 mm FWHM (Friston et al., 1995a). After preprocessing, 
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functional images were analyzed using an event-related model (Worsley & Friston, 1995), under the 
general linear model assumption (Friston et al., 1995b). Each stimulus category (pleasant, unpleasant, and 
neutral) for the Internal and External tasks was modeled as a separate regressor and used to derive 
contrast images for second-level and correlation analyses. Contrast images coding for:  
(1) the main effect of introspection ([Internal task – External task]), (2) the main effect of viewing 
unpleasant stimuli ([Unpleasant –Neutral]), and (3) the interaction effect of interoceptive awareness 
([Internal Unpleasant – Internal Neutral] - [External Unpleasant – External Neutral], were entered into 
one-and two-sample t-tests in order to investigate population-level effects and any group differences. 
These analyses were thresholded at p<0.001 uncorrected.  
The neural basis of the participants’ degree of self-reported emotional awareness was investigated in each 
group by regressing individual scores on the alexithymia and empathy scales onto neural activity (whole 
brain analysis) when introspecting upon emotion. For regression analyses a threshold of p<0.005 
uncorrected was used.  
RESULTS  
Questionnaires  
Fourteen HFA/AS (one participant failed to complete the questionnaire) and fifteen control participants 
completed questionnaires indexing their degree of alexithymia (TAS-20 and BVAQ) and empathy 
(Interpersonal Reactivity Index; IRI). The individual data are presented in Figure 2. (Appendix Figure A1 
presents means and standard deviations for the subscales of the questionnaires.)  
Alexithymia. As expected (Hill et al., 2004), the HFA/AS group had a significantly higher total TAS-20 
score than controls (df = 27; t = 2.8; p < .01). Their problem was particularly associated with describing 
feelings (subscale df = 27; t = 3.4; p < .01). On the BVAQ questionnaire the HFA/AS group did not differ 
from the controls on the total score, but showed poor insight (df = 27; t = 3.2; p < .005) and impaired 
cognition (df = 27; t = 2.2; p <.05).  
Empathy. Overall we found a significant correlation between the perspective-taking subscale and the 
empathic-concern subscale of the IRI (r=.593, p < .05), and therefore combined these two subscales and 
used the combined score in subsequent regression analyses. On the combined score the HFA/AS group 
scored significantly lower than the control group (df = 26; t = 2.9; p < .05). They also scored significantly 
lower on the perspective taking subscale alone (df = 26; t = 4.3; p < .001).  
Correlations between alexithymia and empathy. In controls, a significant correlation was found between 
scores on the alexithymia questionnaires (TAS-20) and scores on the empathic-concern and perspective-
taking subscales of the IRI (empathic-concern scale, r=-0.682, r=682, p < .01; and perspective-taking 
scale, r=-0.661, p < .01), supporting the suggested link between alexithymia and empathy. In the 
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HFA/AS group, too, a highly significant correlation was found between the alexithymia and empathy 
questionnaires, specifically for the empathic-concern scale (r=-0.853, p < .01).  
Behavioral study  
Overall, the pattern of results suggests that the tasks were of equal difficulty for the two groups, at least as 
indexed by RTs, allowing us to discount unequal task difficulty as an explanation of any group difference 
in neural activity. RT measures established that for both groups the External task was more difficult, i.e., 
was performed more slowly, F(1,26) = 23.64, p < 0.001. (Appendix, Figure A2).  
Figure 2 about here 
Interestingly, we found significant, and equal, RT increases when negative stimuli were judged in the 
external task for both the HFA/AS, F(1,26) = 11.59, p = 0.002, and Control, F(1,26) = 9.11, p = 0.006, 
groups. This is consistent with the finding that negative affective stimuli interfere with cognitive tasks 
(Blair et al., 2007; Simpson et al., 2000) and on this evidence both groups view the stimuli as emotional 
and they do so to an equal extent. In terms of rated valence, the HFA/AS and control groups did not 
differ, F(1,26) <1, and there was no correlation between self-reported Alexithymia and rated valence. 
Hence we assume that all participants were equally able to differentiate between the stimulus categories 
pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant, and that the stimulus categories were appropriate for participants with 
HFA/AS.  
Functional imaging results  
1. Activity associated with emotional awareness and empathy in HFA/AS and Control groups  
The neural system underpinning emotional awareness was identified by regressing participants’ self-
reported degree of alexithymia, and empathy, onto the neural activity when introspecting in the presence 
of emotional arousal (see Section 2 below) separately for each group. In order to be confident that 
introspection on emotion was the appropriate condition with which to regress the alexithymia and 
empathy questionnaire scores, we also regressed the scores onto neural activity when introspecting 
(irrespective of the emotional content of stimuli) and onto neural activity when presented with unpleasant 
stimuli (irrespective of task). However, there were no significant correlations with either the alexithymia 
questionnaire, nor with the empathy questionnaire, in any area using these contrasts. Therefore, we 
present results from correlations with activity during introspection on emotion only.  
Correlations of neural activity with alexithymia and empathy scores. Scores on the alexithymia 
questionnaires (negatively) and on the empathy questionnaire (positively) were significantly correlated 
with activity in mid-anterior insula (Figure 3 and Appendix Table A4) bilaterally in both groups, and 
were also correlated with activity in the left amygdala in the autism group (Figure 4 and Appendix Table 
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A4). In order to elucidate the correlation between anterior insula activity and the combined empathy 
score we also separately correlated activity with the perspective-taking and empathic-concern subscales. 
Each showed the same patterns of correlation as the combined score, although at a reduced statistical 
threshold. The location of the correlation in the mid-anterior insula corresponded with previous functional 
studies of interoceptive awareness (Critchley et al., 2004). In contrast, none of the questionnaire measures 
was correlated with activity in the mentalizing system.  
The relationship to lack of empathic concern confirms the proposal by Singer and her colleagues that the 
insula region is not only involved in the conscious perception of one’s own bodily sensations and 
emotions, but is also involved in empathic reactions to the emotions of others (Singer et al., 2004).  
2. Comparison between HFA/AS and Control groups  
In order to discover any differences in neural activity between individuals with HFA/AS and typically 
developing control participants we compared group-level activity in response to: the task set of 
introspection; the presentation of unpleasant stimuli; and introspection in the presence of emotional 
arousal.  
Activation associated with introspection. The comparison of the Internal with the External task showed 
increased activity in a large network of regions, components of which have previously been identified as 
being involved in both self-reflection and mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2006; Ochsner et al., 2004). This 
network included the MPFC, ACC, precuneus, frontal inferior orbital cortex, bilateral temporal poles and 
the cerebellum, p < 0.001 (Figure 5a and Appendix Table A1). These same regions were also activated in 
the autistic participants, although to a reduced statistical and spatial extent (Figure 5b and Appendix 
Table A1). Group comparisons indicated that the autistic participants showed significantly less activity in 
MPFC, ACC, precuneus, left temporal pole and cerebellum, and increased activity in more posterior 
regions such as the parietal and occipital cortex (Figure 5c and Appendix Table A1).  
Activation associated with the presentation of unpleasant stimuli. The comparison of neutral and 
unpleasant pictures regardless of task showed a higher response in the amygdala and inferior orbitofrontal 
regions in both control and HFA/AS participants (Appendix Table A2). These brain regions have 
previously been reported to show enhanced activity in response to strongly unpleasant stimuli (Phillips, 
Drevets, Raush, & Lane, 2003; Taylor, Liberzon, & Koeppe, 2000). Group comparisons revealed greater 
activity in the inferior orbitofrontal cortex, but not amygdala, in control participants, suggesting a 
stronger basic response to emotions in this group.  
Figure 3 about here 
Activation associated with interoceptive awareness of unpleasant emotions. Activity in response to 
introspection on the bodily sensation associated with the feeling of unpleasantness was investigated 
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through the interaction of the task and valence factors. Specifically, we looked for areas that were more 
active when the Internal task was performed on unpleasant vs. neutral stimuli. Both the autism and 
control groups showed increased activity in superior frontal and temporal regions. The groups did not 
show significantly different activity in any region that has been hypothesized to be involved in the 
processing of emotional stimuli (Appendix Table A3). However, at a lower statistical threshold, control 
participants showed enhanced activity in insular cortex bilaterally (left AI ( -34, 14, 2), z=2.68; right AI 
(46, -2, 0), z=2.45) compared to participants with HFA/AS.  
DISCUSSION  
To our knowledge this is the first study examining the neural correlates of self-reported awareness of own 
and other emotions in individuals with HFA/AS. The study also complements existing neuroimaging 
work on individuals with alexithymia and on interoceptive awareness in otherwise healthy individuals 
(Berthoz et al., 2002; Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997; Ochsner et al., 2004). However, the study is 
limited by the relatively small number of participants and the lack of a subgroup of non-autistic 
volunteers with low emotional awareness and empathic concern. Thus, we hope that further work will 
build upon these results.  
Figure 4 about here 
This study adopted a three-level model of emotional experience based on the model of Lambie and 
Marcel (2002). In this model a distinction is made between the neurophysiological arousal associated 
with emotions (first-order experience) and the awareness of this arousal, often referred to as interoception 
(second-order experience). A third level was added to this model, which is reserved for introspection or 
self-processing, which we referred to as the awareness of having emotions. Brain areas can be mapped to 
the model so that first-order experience was localized to the amygdala and inferior orbitofrontal cortex, 
the second level to the anterior insula, and the third level to the mentalizing network. 
Reduced emotional awareness as reported in questionnaires could not be explained by a reduced 
emotional response in the amygdala-orbito-frontal system to presentation of unpleasant stimuli. Thus, the 
first-order emotional experience of Lambie and Marcel (2002) does not seem to be affected by degree of 
alexithymia and lack of empathy. Neither could alexithymia and lack of empathy be explained by 
problems in adopting the task set of introspection. Instead, self-reported poor awareness of own and 
others’ feelings both in autistic and typically-developing individuals, was strongly associated with a 
reduced response in interoceptive cortex, especially anterior insula (Craig, 2003; Critchley, 2005). 
Correlational analyses showed that the level of activity in this region correlated significantly and 
negatively with scores on both alexithymia measures. The higher the alexithymia score the lower the 
activity. These data suggest that in the condition most relevant to alexithymia, i.e. when the individual’s 
own emotional state must be consciously represented, activity in the insula is associated with the degree 
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to which alexithymia is reported.  
This brain response was assessed when participants introspected on their inner experience in the presence 
of unpleasant stimuli, and this is consistent with the proposal that the function of the insula is to provide a 
representation of bodily states that enables conscious awareness of feelings. We suggest it is a lack of 
conscious awareness of these representations that characterizes alexithymic symptoms in emotional 
awareness, i.e., an impairment in Lambie and Marcel’s second-order emotional experience.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
Our findings are consistent with existing models of alexithymia that suggest a ‘‘decoupling’’ of 
physiological arousal due to an emotional state from the conscious representation of the arousal (Lane & 
Schwartz, 1987). This raises the possibility that alexithymic symptoms may vary as a function of the 
degree of physiological arousal evoked by a particular emotional state. This suggestion is in accord with 
the results of several neuroimaging studies on alexithymic individuals, which showed that patterns of 
neural activity depend on which emotion is represented (Berthoz et al., 2002; Mantani, Okamoto, Shirao, 
Okada, & Yamawaki, 2005).  
The behavioral measures of self-reported alexithymia and lack of empathy were found to be highly 
correlated with each other. Moreover, we observed significant correlation between activity in the insula 
cortex not only with alexithymia scores but also with scores on empathic concern and perspective taking. 
Thus, the areas where activity was correlated with alexithymia scores were the same areas where activity 
correlated with empathy scores. In agreement with other theorists (Lane & Schwartz, 1987), we 
hypothesize that the same neural architecture underlies the conscious representation of emotion in the self 
and in others. We suggest that the insula subserves this function. More speculatively, our results suggest 
that conscious representation of bodily and emotional states may be carried out by different networks 
from those involved in representing mental states such as beliefs, and that empathy as far as it involves 
the representation of another’s emotional state, may be neurologically distinct from the representation of 
another’s belief states (Singer, 2006).  
The finding of reduced activation of medial prefrontal, temporal and precuneus regions in HFA/AS 
participants while introspecting is of particular interest, even though it did not show any relationship to 
alexithymic symptoms. It is consistent with the recently observed abnormal lack of activation in these 
regions during rest, and interpreted as an abnormal lack of introspection during rest conditions (Kennedy 
et al., 2006). Since the same brain regions are activated during mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2006), it 
appears that the same network is active when monitoring the mental states of others as when monitoring 
one’s own mental states.  
On the basis of a study by Moriguchi et al. (2006) we would have expected that scores on the alexithymia 
questionnaire, reflecting levels of emotional awareness, to be correlated with activity in the mentalizing 
system. Alexithymia is described as a deficit in identifying and describing feelings (Nemiah et al., 1976), 
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and our participants were continuously asked to rate their emotion during the Internal task. However, 
analysis revealed that activity in the introspection/mentalizing system did not vary as a function of the 
level of alexithymia. Unlike the study of Moriguchi et al., however, our study did not include an explicit 
test of mentalizing and we did not deliberately seek out participants with extreme scores on the 
alexithymia scales. Further work addressing the relationship between alexithymia/emotional awareness 
and mentalizing is therefore needed.  
Indeed, our data reveal a dissociation between the task set of introspection, i.e., what we call the third 
level of emotional awareness and self-reported alexithymia and lack of empathy in our HFA/AS 
participants. There was a subgroup of participants in the HFA/AS group who did not report alexithymia 
or show reduced activity in anterior insula when introspecting on the effect of strongly emotional 
pictures, but still showed reduced activity in the introspection/mentalizing system. We can therefore 
conclude that lack of awareness of bodily states or impairments in second-order emotional experience are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for autistic disorder as currently diagnosed. On the other hand thirdorder 
emotional experience, knowing that you have emotional experiences, may well be critically associated 
with autism.  
In common with previous reports (Ashwin et al., 2007), we found some evidence of hypoactivity in basic 
emotional processing areas (inferior orbitofrontal cortex) although not in the amygdala when processing 
negative stimuli regardless of task. However, activity in these areas did not vary as a function of 
alexithymia in either group.  
One question for the future is why so many individuals with HFA/AS report alexithymic symptoms and a 
lack of empathy. The only condition where activity was related to questionnaire scores of alexithymia and 
lack of empathy was when participants were required to introspect on their emotions. Interestingly, in this 
condition, self-reported emotional awareness was correlated with activity in the anterior insula in the 
control group but with the anterior insula and the amygdala in the HFA/AS group. We have localized 
first-and second-order emotional response to the amygdala and anterior insula, respectively. Therefore it 
seems that alexithymic symptoms are normally mediated in the second-order emotional response. In the 
case of autism, however, a complex interaction between first-, and secondorder awareness seems to apply. 
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Figure 1. Task design and example stimuli. Participants were asked to view emotional or neutral pictures 
and either rate the emotion evoked in them by the stimuli (Internal task), or to judge the black/white color 




Figure 2. Questionnaire scores. Individual scores for participants with HFA/AS are shown in red and for 
controls in green. Each participant is identified by the same number to facilitate comparison. (a) Toronto 
Alexithymia questionnaire. Borderline scores (52-60) are shown between the black lines; scores >60 
indicate alexithymia. (b) Bermond–Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire – Cognitive subscale. (c) Davis 




Figure 3. Neural correlates of alexithymia and empathy in HFA/AS and control groups. Activity in the 
left and right anterior insula correlates with alexithymia (negatively) and empathy (positively). Clusters 
are superimposed onto an average T1 image derived from all participants and the axial views of the 
insular cortex are presented. Functional data specific to introspection on negative emotions was used for 
the correlation analysis. Activity in the left anterior insula cortex: (i) controls (-32, 20, 2) z-score = 2.7, 
cluster = 9; HFA/AS (-40, 4, 0), z-score = 3.73, cluster = 12 is plotted against participants’ scores on the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS – 20) (ii) controls (-32, 20, 2), z-score = 3.1, cluster = 5; HFA/AS (-40, 
4, -4), z-score = 3.59, cluster = 14 is plotted against participants’ scores on the Bermond-Vorst 
Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) (iii) controls (-32, 20, 2), z-score = 2.73, cluster = 5; HFA/AS (-34, 





Figure 4. Neural correlates of alexithymia and empathy in the HFA/AS group. Activity in the left 
amygdala correlates with alexithymia (negatively) and empathy (positively). Clusters are superimposed 
onto an average T1 image derived from all participants and coronal and axial views of the amygdala are 
presented. Functional data specific to introspection on negative emotions were used for the correlation 
analysis. Activity in the left amygdala (-18, -8, -20), z-score = 2.87, cluster = 5; (-16, -6, -16), z-score = 
3.10, cluster = 5; (-20, -10, -16), z-score = 3.49, cluster = 15) is plotted against participants’ scores on the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS 20), Bermond Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) and 




Figure 5. Increase in activity when activation evoked by the Internal task is contrasted with that evoked 
by the External task (irrespective of stimulus valence) and parameter estimates of this contrast in areas 
with significant group differences. (a) Increase in activity during the Internal task in controls. (b) Increase 
in activity during the Internal task in HFA/AS. (c) Difference between control and HFA/AS groups. (d g) 
Increase in activity during the Internal task: (d) Left mid/inferior temporal pole (-50, -2, -34), z-score = 
4.63, cluster = 132 (e) Left Precuneus (-10, -54, 38), z-score = 3.15, cluster = 46 (f) Right Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (10, 38, 32), z-score = 4.27, cluster = 239 (g) Left Superior Frontal gyrus (-14, 56, 32), 
z-score = 3.7, cluster = 73. Color bars represent t -statistic values. Clusters are superimposed onto an 
average T1 image derived from all participants.  
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Supplementary material -Table 2 –Internally- vs. externally-oriented task (*brain regions corrected for cluster level 
at p<0.05) 
INTERNAL > EXTERNAL task at p<0.001    
  MNI coordinates of peak activation (mm)   
Side Brain region x y z cluster t-value 
      
CONTROLS      
L Rectus -4 36 -14 580 6.65* 
L Frontal Sup -14 54 32 1343 6.08* 
L Frontal Sup medial -6 56 16 1343 4.91* 
R Frontal Sup medial 4 52 28 1343 4.47* 
L Frontal Mid -24 50 26 1343 5.52* 
L ACC -12 40 26 1343 4.93* 
R ACC 8 42 28 1343 4.03* 
L SMA -4 8 70 28 3.86 
L Precuneus  -4 -46 34 128 4.93 
L Frontal Inf orb -36 16 -18 1369 6.01* 
R Frontal Inf orb 30  20 -20 691 4.54* 
L Temporal Mid -58 -4 -22 1369 5.19* 
R Temporal Mid 60 -6 -24 691 4.01* 
L Temporal Inf -46 8 -38 1369 5.84* 
R Temporal Pole Sup 34 8 -18 691 4.73* 
L Temporal Pole Mid -40 14 -36 1369 7.02* 
R Temporal Pole Mid 44 14 -36 691 7.62* 
L Temporal Pole Inf -34 6 -36 1369 6.53* 
L Insula  -36 8 -6 15 4.20 
L Angular gyrus  -40 -60 20 33 4.45 
R Parahyppocampus 30 -8 -28 249 4.74* 
L Fusiform  -26 -30 -24 69 5.85 
L Cerebellum -22 -76 -32 66 4.94 
R Cerebellum 18 -80 -34 530 6.15* 
       
HFA/AS      
L Rectus -4 42 -16 30 3.94 
R Frontal Sup med 8 56 16 15 3.92 
L Frontal Mid -44 10 48 11 4.38 
R Precuneus  8 -56 40 43 3.98 
R Frontal Inf orb 36 26 -22 14 4.02 
R Temporal Pole Mid 46 10 -42 7 3.98 
R Angular gyrus  58 -60 28 8 3.89 
R Lingual  24 -94 -18 39 4.03 
       
CONTROLS > HFA/AS      
L Rectus -12 38 -14 10 3.28 
L Frontal Sup -14 56 32 73 4.34 
L Frontal Sup medial -12 56 14 35 3.54 
L Frontal Inf -36 28 24 30 3.69 
R ACC 10 38 32 239 5.13 
L Cingulum Mid  -6 -22 50 30 3.30 
L Precuneus  -10 -54 38 46 3.49 
L Temporal Inf -50 -2 -34 132 5.74 
L Temporal Pole Mid -56 4 -30 132 7.02 
L Post central  62 -8 34 10 3.49 
L Cerebellum -6 -50 -30 370 4.72* 
R Cerebellum 6 -54 -34 370 4.07* 
       
HFA/AS> CONTROLS       
L Precentral -30 -10 68 38 3.86 
R Precuneus  10 -58 48 17 3.50 
L Parietal Inf -30 -50 50 13 3.57 
R Lingual 8 -40 -6 32 3.76 
L Occipital Sup  -20 -78 30 12 3.41 
R Occipital Sup 26 -82 30 194 3.70 
L Occipital Mid -26 -96 2 12 3.41 
R Occipital Mid 38 -80 32 197 3.91 
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Supplementary material -Table 3 – Emotional vs. neutral stimuli presentation  
UNPLEASANT > NEUTRAL stimuli at p<0.001   
  MNI coordinates of peak activation (mm)   
Side Brain region x y z cluster t-value 
      
CONTROLS      
L Frontal Inf orb -28 34 -14 16 4.64 
L Temporal Mid -46 -40 -20 55 4.48 
L Amygdala -32 -4 -14 23 3.83 
       
HFA/AS      
L Rectus -2 54 -16 27 4.25 
L Precuneus  -8 -60 52 12 3.62 
R Frontal Inf  58 20 30 21 3.14 
L Frontal Inf orb -44 48 -12 86 3.84 
L Frontal Inf orb/insula -42 18 -10 33 3.98 
L Temporal Mid -62 -58 14 23 3.70 
L Amygdala -18 -2 -18 6 3.37 
L Angular gyrus  -42 -54 38 12 3.60 
L Lingual  -22 -80 -10 10 3.68 
R Lingual 16 -84 -8 51 3.59 
R Occipital Mid  34 -86 10 140 4.39 
L Occipital Inf  -44 -74 -6 98 4.90 
L Cerebellum -12 -86 -20 17 6.00 
       
CONTROLS> HFA/AS      
L Frontal Inf orb -28 34 -14 17 3.53 
R Cerebellum 6 -84 -40 31 3.57 
       
HFA/AS> CONTROLS      
R Occipital Mid  34 -88 10 98 4.20 
R Calcarine 2 -80 -6 44 3.90 
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Supplementary material -Table 4 –Internal- vs. external-oriented task during negative vs. neutral stimuli 
presentation  
INTERNAL [UNPLEASANT - NEUTRAL] > EXTERNAL [UNPLEASANT - NEUTRAL] at p<0.001 
  MNI coordinates of peak activation (mm)   
Side Brain region x y z cluster t-value 
      
CONTROLS > HFA/AS      
R Corpus Callosum -2 24 8 23 3.79 
       
HFA/AS > CONTROLS       
  no suprathreshold voxels   
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 Supplementary material -Table 5 –Regression analyses with questionnaire measures.. 
Regression analyses at p<0.005 uncorrected.(* significant at p < 0.001 uncorrected) 
  MNI coordinates of peak activation (mm)   
Side Brain region x y z cluster t-value 
      
TAS       
                   CONTROLS       
L Insula/operculum  -34 28 0 8 3.93 
       
 HFA/AS      
L Insula cortex -40 4 0 12 5.29* 
L Amygdala -18 -8 -20 5 3.53 
       
BVAQ      
 CONTROLS    
L Insula/operculum -32 20 2 5 3.86* 
R Insula cortex 44 20 -2 5 3.81* 
       
 HFA/AS      
L Insula cortex -44 4 -4 14 4.96* 
 Insula/operculum -36 14 0 9 3.89* 
R Insula cortex 48 0 10 52 7.40* 
L Amygdala -16 -6 -16 5 3.94* 
       
IRI      
 CONTROLS    
L Insula/operculum -32 20 2 2 3.25 
       
 HFA/AS      
L Insula/operculum -32 10 2 7 5.83* 
L Amygdala -20 -10 -16 15 4.38* 
       
 
